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1. Introduction
In the early 80's, John Perry engaged in a close and fruitful colaboration with the 
logician  Jon  Barwise  (1942  –  2000).  Together,  they  developed  a  new  theoretical 
framework known as Situation Theory. The scope of the framework was very wide, 
going from ontology and metaphysics, via logic, to theories of informational content, 
content of attitudes (such as beliefs) and of other cognitive states and faculties (such 
as perception),  and,  perhaps most importantly,  theory  of  meaning.  Qua theory of 
linguistic meaning, the framework came to be known as situation semantics, although 
the term, as used nowadays, applies to a larger class of semantic frameworks, which 
all have in common the use of 'situations' as a core theoretical notion (or, at least, an 
important technical device), but many among which, at the end of the day, do not 
have  that  much  in  common  with  the  original  Barwise-Perry  framework.1 The 
framework was laid out in  Situations and Attitudes, frst published in 1983 by MIT 
Press,  followed by an augmented edition, by CSLI Publications in 1999.2  
It  is fair to say that  Situations and Attitudes was an extremely infuential book, 
even if the original framework itself  did not survive to become a major semantic 
framework  in  the  current  linguistic  landscape,  and  even  if  Perry  himself  has 
abandoned it in his more recent writings. It is also fair to say that while some of the 
philosophical  ideas  underlying  Perry's  and  Barwise's  approach  have  been 
incorporated into many among the contemporary theories of content (information 
1 For instance, the term situation semantics as used by contemporary semanticists will be more easily taken to 
refer to frameworks such as those discussed e.g. in Kratzer (2007), including Kratzer's own account (cf.  
Kratzer 2011), which certainly originate with the ideas put forward in Barwise and Perry (1983), but still 
diverge in important ways from the Barwise-Perry framework, as much in technical details as by their failure 
to endorse many among the underlying philosophical ideas.
2 In particular, the CSLI 1999 edition includes ''Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes'' (Barwise and Perry 
(1985)), written as an imaginary interview in which Barwise and Perry reply to the various comments and 
criticisms addressed to situation semantics.
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content,  attitude  content,  semantic  content),  like,  for  instance,  certain  insights 
regarding the effciency of language, a number of other ideas have remained ignored, 
misinterpreted,  or  simply  underestimated.  This  may  be  because  of  a  failure  to 
recognize  how  deeply  the  approach  advocated  by  Perry  and  Barwise  calls  into 
question some fundamental philosophical assumptions inherented from the Fregean 
tradition. In this respect, situation theory, when considered with all its bits and pieces 
with which it was delivered in the early 80's, remains a largely unexplored treasure. 
Its founding fathers (Perry and Barwise) were probably right when they feared that 
situation semantics was ''perhaps ahead of its time''.3
My goal in this chapter will be to bring to the foreground the main tenets of 
situation semantics.  I  hope that  the reader will  get  a  fair  sense of  the theoretical 
motivations  that  were  driving  the  framework,  and  that  continue  to  be  of  major 
signifcance to Perry's larger philosophical enterprise. I will thus be more concerned 
with the ideas themselves than with the way in which they were implemented in the 
formal framework of situation semantics. The chapter is organized as follows. I will 
start  by  rehearsing  some of  the  central  aspects  of  what  can  be  described  as  the 
Fregean heritage, that is, the approach pursued by Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who is 
often characterized as the "father" of modern logic, semantics, as well as philosophy 
of language of the analytic tradition.4 This will be important in order to understand 
the  context  in  which  situation semantics  saw light,  and to  appreciate  the  almost 
revolutionary nature of some of the ideas behind it. Indeed, certain tenets of situation 
theory may be viewed as reactions directed against some of the central aspects of 
Frege's doctrine, well-established in the logical, semantic, and even cognitive theories 
that dominated the scene in the early 80's and that, albeit with some amendments, 
have  persisted  as  the  main  stream  up  to  our  days.  After  having  clarifed  the 
background, I will turn to one of the main motivations behind situation semantics 
(and, arguably, behind Perry's long-term project as well): the search for an account of 
meaning that  relies  upon an account  of  information,  where the  latter  is  crucially 
driven by the task of explaining how cognitive agents like us are led to act in ways 
they do, given how they are attuned to their environment. In other words, theory of 
meaning,  theory of information, and theory of action become intertwined and even 
unseparable. With that in the back of our minds, I will articulate the exposition of 
situation semantics around eight themes:
(a) the primacy of situations: the idea that, both from an epistemological and a 
metaphysical  point  of  view,  reality  consists  primarily  of  situations,  while  other 
categories,  such as individuals, properties, or locations, arise as  uniformities  across 
3 Barwise and Perry (1999) p. xxx.
4 For logic,  the most relevant source is  Frege's  Begriffsschrift  (1879; occasionally translated in English as 
Ideology), while for language, it is  Über Sinn und Bedeutung  (1892; translated in English at times as  On 
Sense and Denotation, at others as On Sense and Reference).
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situations.  
(b)  partiality:  the  idea  that  information  is,  as  a  matter  of  rule  rather  than 
exception, partial: it tells us something only about a certain part of reality, leaving the 
rest open.
(c)  the  effciency of  language:  the  idea that  the  same words can be  used in 
different contexts to mean different things (and that this, too, is a rule rather than 
exception).
(d)  a relational theory of meaning: the idea that meaning should be seen as a 
relation between situations, rather than some kind of independent entity, detachable 
from both the world and the language (or other representational systems).             
(e)  uniformities and constraints: the idea is that agents get attuned to various 
kinds of uniformities, which allow them to classify the reality in ways that enhance 
their  capacities  for  action  and  help  them  ''cope  with  the  new  situations  that 
continually arise'' (p. 10); constraints are then seen as uniformities that arise among 
the  ways  in  which  situations  relate  to  one  another,  while  attunement  to  such 
contraints enables cognitive agents to ''pick up information about one situation from 
another'' (ibid.).   
(f) the reference relation and its relata: an account of reference that departs from 
the standard account on (at  least)  two scores:  instead of  taking reference to  be a 
relation between a  sentence and its  truth value,  it  takes it  to be a relation between 
utterances and (other) situations; secondly, instead of taking reference to be relation 
between a name (or another singular term) and an individual, it takes it to be a relation 
again between utterances (of those terms) and other situations, and grounds it upon 
relations that hold among the individuals  involved in those situations (the speaker, 
on the one hand, and the things and people to which/whom she is referring, on the 
other).
(g) truth as a uniformity across situations: the idea that truth is merely a device 
that  helps  us  classify  situations;  truth  partitions  situations  of  a  certain  type,  in 
particular utterance situations, in terms of a certain property that they share, viz. that 
there is some (appropriately related) situation that they accurately describe.
(h)  semantic  innocence  and attitude  reports:  an  account  of  the  semantics  of 
attitude reports, involving constructions such as 'believes that', 'sees' (used with 'that' 
or with an infnitival clause), and the like, for which one of the main motivations is 
that the embedded clause (i.e. the sentence that comes after 'that') should have the 
same meaning as it does when it occurs on its own.
Among these eight themes, fve have already been singled out by Barwise and 
Perry in their  Preface  to the reedition issue, namely (b), (c), (d), (e) and (h) (with (c) 
and (d) gettiing merged under a single theme). I have added the other three themes, 
because, with hindsight, they appear to be as important and innovative as the other 
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fve. I hope that articulating situation semantics around these eight tenets will prove 
helpful for the exposition; but before we get there, let us frst briefy describe the 
background from which situation theory emerged.
  
2. Breaking off with the Fregean heritage  
In  order  to  better  understand the programme of  situation semantics,  we need to 
remind  ourselves  of  what  the  philosophical  and logical  landscape  looked like in 
those times. The 60's and 70's were very fruitful years for the development of analytic 
philosophy. It was also in those years that the one of the discipline of linguistics, 
known today as formal, or model-theoretic semantics, developed at the interface of logic 
and philosophy,  as  a result of  using the tools of logic  to study natural  language. 
Among the fgures engaged in that sort of programme let us mention Rudolf Carnap, 
Alonzo Church, Saul Kripke, Richard Montague, David Lewis, Jaakko Hintikka, Max 
Cresswell,  and  David  Kaplan.5 They  all  came  from  a  broadly  Fregean  tradition, 
taking on board many elements  constitutive of  Frege's  view, without  questioning 
them.6 
Caricaturing somewhat, here are the four foundational corners of Frege's picture:
(i)  sense (Frege's  Sinn):  this  is,  fguratively  speaking,  the  glue  that  serves  to 
connect the world, the mind and the language.  A linguistic expression  expresses  a 
sense, the mind grasps it, and the sense, in turn, ''determines'' something out there in 
the world. Senses themselves are  not the world's citizens like the other things that 
surround us; rather they belong to the ''Third Realm'' (which is a bit like Plato's realm 
of ideas). 
(ii)  reference and  truth:  sense  determines  reference;  in  particular,  when  the 
linguistic expression at stake is a sentence, it expresses what Frege calls a thought 
(Gedanke), and it has a truth value as its reference. There are two truth values, the 
True and the False. All true sentences share the same reference, and so do all false 
sentences.  As Frege himself  put it,  at  the level  of  reference ''all  that  is  specifc is 
obliterated''.7
5 See e.g. Carnap (1960); Cresswell (1973); Hintikka (1967); Kaplan (1989); Kripke (1963);  Lewis (1970); 
Montague (1970a, 1970b) (for Montague's programme, see also Partee 1997);  .    
6 Some readers might protest against including Kripke among these authors: after all, wasn't one of his most 
famous contribution to philosophy of language, viz. his Naming and Necessity (1972), precisely an attempt to 
demolish Frege's view on proper names?! Though this may be right, it is fair to still see Kripke as working 
within a broadly Fregean tradition. Let us also note that Kripke is a pioneer of possible world semantics 
(indeed, providing a uniform semantics for the various modal logics that, until his work, only existed as 
axiomatic systems, was his most famous contribution to logic), and that situation semantics was, among other 
things, put forward as an alternative to possible world semantics.      
7 Frege (1892): ''If now the truth value of a sentence is its reference, then on the one hand all true sentences 
have the same reference and so, on the other hand, do all false sentences. From this we see that in the 
reference of the sentence all that is specific is obliterated.'' Frege's choice of truth values as the reference for  
sentences results, at least partly, from an argument that came to be know as ''the slingshot'', to which we will 
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(iii)  eternalism: senses are ''eternal'': they do not come into or go out existence, 
they do not exist in time. Even more importantly, they do not determine reference in 
time;  that  is  to say,  a  reference determined by a sense has always been,  and will 
always be, so determined.   In particular, a true sentence is atemporally true, hence it 
has always been and will always be true. Reference (and, in particular, truth value) is 
fully determined by sense. What is more, any given sentence uniquely expresses such 
an eternal sense. Thus if we consider the sentence ''I am a philosopher'' as uttered by 
John Perry in 2011, and the sentence ''I am a philosopher'' as uttered by Jon Barwise 
in 1991, we are led to conclude that, appearances notwithstanding, these are not the 
same sentence after all! Rather, they are different sentences, since context is, for Frege, 
a constitutive part of the linguistic expression itself.8   
(iv)  compositionality:  the  idea  that  the  meaning  of  a  complex  expression  is 
''composed'' of, or determined by, or is a function of, the meanings of its constituent 
expressions, given the way they are put together.9
It is worth pointing out another remarkable feature of Frege's view; not so much 
an element on its own as one that falls out from the other assumptions, and more 
specifcally from the interaction of (ii)  and (iv)  above:  it  is  the feature sometimes 
called 'semantic ascent', namely, the idea that in opaque contexts, such as embedded 
clauses in belief reports, the reference of a sentence isn't a truth value, but rather, the 
customary sense of the clause at stake. Frege maintained that compositionality held 
not only at the level of sense, but also at the level reference, and, consequently, he 
maintained that if an element of a sentence is replaced by another one with the same 
reference, the reference of the whole sentence will remain intact. But now, consider 
the  report  ''John  believes  that  Paris  is  the  capital  of  France''  and  replace  the 
embedded clause with some true other sentence – for instance, ''John believes that it 
is sunny in Paris on April 20, 2011''. While the former may be true, the latter may be 
false, for John may rationally believe, albeit mistakenly, that it wasn't sunny in Paris 
on that day. Frege's way out was to say that in such contexts, the sentence refers no 
longer to a truth value, but to its customary sense. Note that repeated embeddings 
will each time shift the reference, so that in ''Mary knows that John believes that Paris 
is the capital of France'', the embedded sentence has a meaning different both from 
the one it has when on its own and the one it has in '' John believes that Paris is the 
capital of France'' alone. It is against the idea that words get to mean different things 
return in Sect. 3.      
8 See e.g. Frege (1918, p. 332): ''[T]he time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought''. Among Frege 
scholars, there is still a lot of controversy as to what was Frege's view on context-dependence. What is fairly 
uncontroversial is that Frege regarded context-dependence as a flaw of natural language, and considered the  
latter to be defective. He wrote e.g.: "If our language were logically more perfect, we would perhaps have no 
further need of logic, or we might read it off from the language. But we are far from being in such a position. 
Work in logic just is, to a large extent, a struggle with the logical defects of language" (1915, p.323).        
9 How exactly compositionality is to be formulated is an open and hotly debated question in philosophy of 
language, which, for our purposes, we may leave open, since nothing of significance will hinge on that.        
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depending on how deeply they are embedded that Davidson's request for 'semantic 
innocence' is directed. That will be the last of the eight themes around which I will 
discuss situation semantics.10  
As we will see in greater detail in the next section, all of these elements, except 
for a certain version of compositionality, were called into question and consequently 
rejected  by  the  Perry-Barwise  approach.  Nevertheless,  it  may  still  be  said  that 
situation  semantics  belongs  to  the  same  broader  programme  of  model-theoretic 
semantics for natural language to which we were alluding a couple of paragraphs 
above. Barwise and Perry themselves are careful to note that ''[they] want conserve 
[…]  recent  insights  and  the  powerful  methods  of  traditional  model-theoretic 
analysis'' (1999, xii). But while situation semantics shares the aim of laying down a 
rigorous framework for the study of  meaning in language and its  relationship to 
cognition, it does not endorse the burden of the Fregean heritage that many other 
frameworks,  such  as  those  of  Montague  or  Kaplan,  have,  perhaps  inadvertantly, 
taken on board. 
Already in his groundbreaking article ''Frege on Demonstratives'' (1977), Perry 
put  forward  serious  concerns  regarding  Frege's  theory  of  sense  as  a  theory  of 
cognitive states such as beliefs. One of the upshots of Perry's early work was to show 
that the Fregean notion of sense cannot at the same time accomplish the two tasks 
that Frege devised it for: (1) account for how mental states get to be  about  the real, 
concrete things that surround us; (2) account for  cognitive signifcance  in a way that 
accurately explains action and behavior. To illustrate with an example, suppose that I 
point to a cup and say ''This cup is full of water''. The frst task is to account for how I 
can thereby express a belief  about  that  very cup (rather  than about  some mental 
image of mine or, as Russell might have it, a sense-datum); the second, for how, if I 
am thirsty and want water, I will reach towards the cup at stake provided that I think 
of it as this cup, but I need not behave the same way if I merely think of, say, the cup 
from which I drank last night that it is full of water, without realizing that that's the 
cup in front of me.
The  proposal  that  Perry  outlines  in  those  early  articles  (1977,  1979)  is  often 
interpreted  as  a  proposal  to  divide,  as  it  were,  Frege's  notion  of  sense  into  two 
distinct notions: 
(i) a coarse-grained notion that serves to connect the mind with the world, and to 
account for what our beliefs have in common when we are thinking of the same 
object,  even  though we  are  differently  related  to  the  object  and  thus  think  of  it 
differently (this would be what Perry called objects of belief, and what Kaplan called 
content);
(ii) a fner-grained notion that serves to account for cognitive signifcance and its 
10 On a historical note, when Perry and Barwise met, Barwise had been developing an account of constructions 
involving verbs of perception (like 'see') that he argued could not be fitted into a Fregean account of attitudes. 
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role in  motivating action (this  would  be  what  Perry called  belief  states,  and what 
Kaplan called character). 
I  believe  that  such  an  interpretation  of  Perry's  early  view is,  if  not  outright 
mistaken, then certainly opposed to the spirit of Perry's approach.11  Admittedly, it is 
not our task in this chapter to set straight a proper understanding of Perry's views on 
mind and action. But it is one of our tasks to set straight the driving motivations 
behind situation semantics, and one of them is clearly the aim of providing a theory 
of meaning (perhaps even a theory of intentionality, in Brentano's sense) that should 
be able to explain how agents like us can acquire and exchange information about the 
world around us and, as a result of that, act on this world in a way most suitable to 
our well-being.12 And the frst  step towards such a theory lies  in recognizing the 
extent to which Frege's appeal to senses, those third realm entities that are supposed 
to connect world, mind and language, is fawed. 
The picture that Perry and Barwise invite us to contemplate exploits the idea that 
agents  get  to  be  attuned  to  the  various  regularities  that  they  encounter  in  their 
environment. Such regularities constitute uniformities across situations, with the help 
of  which agents  are  able  to  classify  various aspects  of  reality,  to  anticipate  novel 
situations,  and  to  act  for  the  purpose  of  their  own  well-being.  Among  such 
uniformities  are  those  that  systematically  relate  certain  situations  to  others.  For 
example, whenever there is smoke, there is fre nearby. An agent who is attuned to 
this uniformity is better off than others who aren't, since for such an agent, a situation 
involving smoke carries the information that there must be fre around, and makes it 
possible for the agent to act appropriately (look for a fre-extinguisher, call fremen, 
etc.).
Uniformities  across  relations  between  situations  are,  in  the  Barwise-Perry 
terminology,  constraints,  and come in  different  types.  For  instance,  the  systematic 
connection between smoke and fre will be a nomic constraint, since it derives from 
the laws of physics and the causal links between fre and smoke. But constraints can 
also  be  conventional:  for  instance,  the  sound  of  a  fre-alarm  also  carries  the 
information that there is fre around. Yet, unlike the case of smoke, attunement to this 
constraint  requires  that  the  agent  be  familiar  with  a  certain  convention  in  place. 
Conventional constraints are by their very nature conditional on the conventions that 
they exploit. 
11 It is true that Perry (1977) lends itself to such an interpretation. Indeed, in his afterward to Perry (1979), 
Perry himself notes: ''In [(1977)] I was trying to construct a conservative modification of Frege's view to take 
care of the problems I saw indexicals and demonstratives posing for it, while in [(1979)] I was putting 
forward my own view'' (1993: p. 43).  Also, what makes such an interpretation recalcitrant may be the too 
frequent confusion between Kaplan's character vs. content distinction, which indeed, as applied to belief and 
cognition along the lines of the suggestions that one can find in Kaplan (1989), can arguably be seen as a 
division (or, if you prefer, a duplication) of Frege's notion of sense, and the distinctions that Perry draws. 
12 The emphasis on agents or, as they prefer to say, organisms, acting for their own well-being, is a recurrent 
theme in Barwise and Perry (c.f. e.g. p. 10 and later chapters).        
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Now, in  this  picture,  meaning is  merely  a type of  constraint  –  and linguistic 
meaning, in particular, is merely a type of conventional constraint. Thus a situation in 
which someone says ''There is fre'' carries, as before, the information that there is fre, 
conditional  upon the  conventions associated with the expressions 'there',  'is',  and 
'fre', and upon the assumption that the person who is saying this is a competent, 
sincere and well-informed speaker. 
Situation semantics, in a nutshell, is an attempt to provide a rigorous framework 
within  which  such  a  'relational'  theory  of  meaning  may  be  developed  and 
systematized.13 While Frege and his heirs saw meaning as something out there in the 
''third  realm''  that  we express  through  language  and  grasp  through thought,  for 
Perry, Barwise, and their heirs, meaning is all around us.
3. Situation semantics: its tenets and motivations  
Now that we have described the philosophical context in which situation theory was 
born, with its constant need to call into question assumptions that philosophers and 
logicians who had been raised in the same context  used to take pretty much for 
granted, and now that we have presented, albeit in rough lines, the picture that Perry 
and Barwise were proposing as an alternative to the Fregean picture, let us take up 
one by one the eight themes listed earlier and, by elaborating on them, offer a (still 
rather rough) reconstrual of the framework of situation semantics. 
(a)  The Primacy of Situations.  For Perry and Barwise, situations are the most 
basic units of reality, both from an epistemological and from a metaphysical point of 
view. They are epistemologically primary in the sense that, as agents, we perceive 
and experience,  frst  and  foremost,  situations;  it  is  only  at  a  later  stage  that  we 
experience  other  ontological  categories,   such  as  objects,  properties,  locations,  or 
time.  And  they  are  metaphysically  primary  in  the  sense  that  all  those  other 
ontological categories are derived from situations, by abstracting over properties of 
situations and relations among them. 
Now, it is a fairly common assumption, among those working in contemporary 
situation theory as well as those working in other frameworks, that situations have 
internal structure. This assumption, appearances notwithstanding, was not shared by 
Barwise and Perry, who insisted that, on the contrary, such a structure is imposed on 
situations  from  an  external  perspective,  by  getting  attuned  to  similarities  and 
uniformities  accross  situations.  Individuals,  properties,  relations,  space-time 
locations, are uniformities that enable us to cluster situations together, and to classify 
13 The idea that meaning arises from the interaction of an agent with his or her environment was inspired, partly 
at least, by ideas that, at about the same time, were developed in the neighboring areas, in particular Gibson's 
theory of perception (see e.g. Gibson 1979) and Dretske's theory of information (Dretske 1981).        
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them  in  various  ways.  Now,  the  widespread  idea  that  a  situation  will,  typically, 
consist of a number of individuals standing in various relations to one another, at a 
certain  time and  at  a  certain  place,  may indeed  be  traced back to  Situations  and 
Attitudes. But it is important to realize that the idea applies only to abstract situations,  
which are a technical device deployed by the framework, not to those situations of 
which reality consists and that we encounter, perceive or act upon. As Barwise and 
Perry write, ''we view real situations as metaphysically and epistemologically prior to 
relations,  individuals,  and  locations.  But  relations,  individuals,  and  locations  are 
metaphysically and epistemologically prior to abstract situations. The latter are build 
out of the former as sets of various kinds'' (p. 58). Thus, the semantic primitives of 
situation  semantics  are  individuals,  relations  and  space-time  locations,  while  the 
primitives of the metaphysics and epistemology of situation semantics are,  rather, 
situations themselves. 
(b)  Partiality.  This  core  feature  of  situation  semantics  exploits  the  idea  that 
information content is always partial. Consider a piece of information that tells us 
that Mary insulted Bill. It tells us something about Mary, and something about Bill. 
But it tells us nothing about Bill's mother or Mary's sister or, for that matter, anyone 
else in the world. Situations, by their very nature, are sources of information that give 
partial such information only, and are, in that respect, very different from possible 
worlds. A world tells us everything about everyone. If we ask of two given objects 
whether they stand in some relation, it will give us a defnite answer  – Yes or No. 
Situations, by contrast, give a defnite asnwer only on a limited number of issues. For 
one, if the objects at stake do not even belong to the situation at stake, it is likely that 
the situation we are looking at won't be able to decide whether they stand in a given 
relation or not. But, importantly, even when the objects belong to a situation, there 
may be issues that  the situation does not decide.  It  is  thus possible to be have a 
situation in which Mary and Bill stand in the relation of insulting, but one that does 
not tell us how it is that she insulted him – whether it was with words, with a gesture, 
or  in  some  other  way.  The  way  in  which  the  idea  is  cashed  out  is  by  defning 
situation-types in terms of  partial  functions from n-ary relations and sequences of  n 
individuals to 0 and 1 (or to False and True). A function is partial (as opposed to total) 
when there are inputs on which it is undefned – which is tantamount to saying that 
for certain sequences of individuals, it simply doesn't tell us whether they stand in a 
given relation or not.   
(c) The Effciency of Language. The term 'effciency' was introduced, by Barwise 
and Perry, to group together several phenomena that are tightly linked to what is 
nowadays preferably called 'context-dependence'.  The general idea is  that  natural 
language  provides  means  that  enable  the  speaker  to  exploit  various  contextual 
factors  in  order  to  communicate  information.  Expressions  like  pronouns  are  a 
paradigmatic  example of effciency.  Thus with the same linguistic  device,  e.g.  the 
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pronoun 'he', I can convey information about an indefnite number of individuals. If I 
say ''He is French'' in a context in which the most salient person is François, I will tell 
you something about François,  but if  I  use the very same sentence in a different 
context, e.g. one in which we have been talking about Paul, then it is about Paul that I 
will say something (viz. that he is French). 
For Barwise and Perry, effciency is one of the essential properties of languages, 
and one that, in turn, (also) accounts for the productivity of language, i.e. the fact that 
with a fnite vocabulary and a fnite number of syntactic operations we can express 
infnitely  many  things.  Note  though  that  productivity  does  not  coincide  with 
effciency.  Indeed,  another  essential  property  of  language that  (also)  accounts  for 
productivity is compositionality, i.e. the fact that with a fnite vocabulary, and a fnite 
number of syntactic operations, we can construct infnitely many well-formed and 
meaningful  expressions,  and  thereby  express  infnitely  many  things. 
Compositionality  (which  Perry  and  Barwise,  like  Frege,  accept  at  the  level  of 
meaning,  but,  unlike  Frege,  not  at  the  level  of  reference)  and  effciency  are 
complementary phenomena that together account for full productivity of language.
Effciency itself covers a family of phenomena, just as context-dependence, as we 
use  the  term nowadays,  does.  The  sort  of  effciency,  or  context-dependence,  that 
pronouns such as 'he' or 'I', and adverbs such as 'here' or 'today', illustrate, is better 
known under the term 'indexicality', and has been widely studied and discussed in 
the  linguistic  and philosophical  literature.  A feature  that  distiguishes  indexicality 
from other forms of effciency is the fact that the way in which the expression exploits 
various  contextual  cues  is  built  into  the  expression's  meaning  itself.  Thus  it  is 
constitutive of the meaning of the frst person pronoun 'I' that it should be used for 
the very person who is using the pronoun (viz. the speaker). In the framework of 
situation  semantics,  this  is  cashed out  through the  way in  which  the  interpreter 
exploits the constraints between utterance situations and described situations. Thus if 
I say ''I am French'', the meaning of the sentence encodes (or, if you prefer, partly 
consists  in)  the  constraint  that  my  utterance  should  be  related  to  the  described 
situation(s) by having in common that the same individual (me) should fgure in both 
situations: in the one, in the quality of the speaker, and in the other, in the quality of 
the subject-matter, i.e. the individual about whom something is being said (viz. that 
the person is French). Although a proper discussion of the account of indexicals that 
one  fnds  in  situation  semantics  deserves  a  chapter  of  its  own,  the  spirit  of  the 
proposal, and the idea that the meaning of indexicals deploys a certain conventional 
relation between the utterance and the person or object that the utterance is about, 
have persisted into Perry's recent theorizing about the topic (see Perry 2001). 
 As mentioned earlier, indexicality is a special case of effciency. Two other forms 
of effciency are worth mentioning. One is what is nowadays referred to as polysemy, 
namely, an essential feature of language that makes it possible for words to acquire 
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new meanings. For example, in the past the word 'folder' used to stand for a certain 
class  of  material  objects,  characterized by their  shape and function,  but  with  the 
development of computers, it acquired a novel meaning on which it (also) stands to a 
certain class of electronic objects.14 
Another form of effciency worth mentioning is perspectival relativity, illustrated 
with expressions like 'behind'. Consider someone uttering ''The table is behind the 
sofa''.  The  informational  content  carried  by  this  utterance  exploits  not  only  the 
constraints that come with the meaning of the sentence, but also the perspective from 
which the content is accessed and evaluated for truth. If the table is between me and 
the sofa, then from my perspective, the utterance is true, but if you are on the other 
side, and the sofa is between you and the table, from your perspective, the utterance 
is not true. Now, one could stipulate that expressions such as 'behind' privilege the 
speaker's  perspective,  in  which  case  the  perspectival  relativity  would  work  very 
much like indexicality, and the above utterance would be true if the sofa is between 
the speaker and the table. In the literature, one often fnds expressions like 'behind' 
assimilated to indexicals. But, for one thing, perspectival expressions display a wider 
range of patterns than indexical pronouns. For another, perspectival relativity is an 
important feature not only of language, but also of the contents of beliefs and other 
mental states that cannot be reduced to (linguistic) indexicality.15 
The  phenomena of  indexicality,  polysemy,  perspective-dependence,  and other 
forms of context-dependence, and the relationships among these phenomena, are in 
the heart of current studies in semantics, pragmatics and philosophy of language.16 
What matters to the present discussion is not so much the account that Perry and 
Barwise  proposed  of  those  phenomena,  but  rather,  their  recognition  of  all  these 
phenomena as essential features of language that call for a rigorous analysis. Let us 
remind ourselves that the context in which situation semantics saw light was that of 
Frege's followers, and that for Frege, natural language was imperfect and defective 
precisely because of features such as ambiguity and context-dependence. Perry's and 
Barwise's  insistence  that  these  are  features  of  effciency  rather  than  defectiveness 
marks an important turn in the history of semantics.
(d) A Relational Theory of Meaning. The idea of a relational theory of meaning 
14 Barwise and Perry do not talk of polysemy but of ambiguity (see 1983: p. 40). But I think it is helpful to put 
the emphasis on polysemy rather than ambiguity, since lexical ambiguity is typically accidental, while 
polysemy is systematic and constitutes a powerful mechanism that makes it possible to recycle the existing 
vocabulary in order to express new concepts. In either case, what matters is that instead of viewing ambiguity 
and polysemy as defective features of language, we see them, as Barwise and Perry write, ''as another aspect  
of the efficiency of language. Expressions are, after all, just uniformities across certain kinds of situations, 
utterances. That an expression can be used in more than one way is just another feature of that expression.''  
(ibid.)         
15 For a discussion of the perspectival relativity in thought, see Perry (1986). See also Recanati (2007).         
16 For collections of articles that demonstrate how large the scope of these phenomena is, see e.g. Kamp and 
Partee (2004), and Recanati, Stojanovic and Villanueva (2010).         
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is one of the aspects of situation semantics that remain most prominent in Perry's 
subsequent  work,  but  also  one  that  departs  most  strikingly  from  the  Fregean 
tradition. At a frst glance, one might have thought that Frege's view, too, endorses 
some version of a relational theory of meaning, to the extent that a sentence is related 
to a sense, or a thought, which constitutes its meaning. This is not what we mean 
when we speak of a relational theory of meaning. For Frege, meaning is an (abstract) 
entity, while sentences (of languages that we speak and in which we formulate our 
thoughts) are related to it through the relation of expressing. For Perry and Barwise, 
meaning  is  a  certain  relation,  one  that  relates  situations  to  situations  (which,  as 
emphasized in (a), are the basic units of reality). In the case of linguistic meaning, the 
relata are, on the one side, utterance situations, and, on the other, described situations 
(which can themselves be utterance situations, as in the case of reported discourse, 
such as ''Mary said that it was raining'').   
One  basic  difference  between  situation  semantics  and  traditional  Fregean 
frameworks is , then, that the former sees meaning as a relation, while the latter sees 
it as an abstract thing or entity. There is another, related difference: the former takes 
meaning  to  be  an  independent  and  autonomous  entity;  thus  if  there  were  no 
languages or other devices to express them, meanings would still exist. For the latter, 
on the other hand, meaning is not really a detachable entity, since it boils down to the 
way  in  which  situations  relate  to,  and  carry  information  about,  other  situations; 
without those very situations, the relations that hold among them and that consitute 
meaning would not exist either. 
Let  me illustrate the idea of  a  relational  theory of  meaning with an example 
(simplifying some aspects of the account). Suppose that I point at Paul and say ''He is 
French''. My utterance has the meaning it has in virtue of the there being a relation 
between the utterance situation and other  situations  such that  one  and the same 
individual,  Paul,  appears  in  both,  and  that  in  the  former,  he  is  a  salient  male 
individual referred to by the speaker, and in the latter, he belongs among the French. 
Note  that,  given  that  I  may be  misiformed,  or  lying,  the  latter  need  not  be  real 
situations, but may be merely hypothetical situations in which Paul is French.
Let me end by briefy connecting this relational theory of meaning to the one that 
we fnd in Perry's refexive-referential theory (2001). There too, meaning arises from 
the relations that utterances bear to the various things and events about which they 
convey information (or, as the case may go, misiformation). For example, if Paul says 
''I am French'', his utterance, we might want to say, means that Paul is French. In the 
refexive-referential framework, the utterance gets to have such a meaning in virtue 
of the fact, among others, that the individual that the utterance is about (that is, Paul) 
stands in a certain relation to the utterance itself (viz. the relation of producing the 
utterance). Such relational components are explicit  in what Perry calls the  refexive 
truth conditions of the utterance, and, even though they are no longer visible in what 
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he calls the referential  truth conditions, still, given that the latter are always derived 
from  the  former,  such  ''incremental''  levels  of  meaning  ultimately  rest  upon  the 
relations in which the utterance stands with respect  to  various other objects and, 
more generally, situations.17 
(e)  Uniformities and Constraints.  I  have  already  introduced  the  notions  of 
uniformity and constraint, which are central notions in situation theory, not only at 
the levels of language, attitudes (belief, desires, etc.) and action, but also at the level 
of  ontology.  As  pointed  out  in  the  section  on  the  Primacy  of  Situations,  the 
ontological  categories  of  individuals,  properties  and  relations  are  derived  from 
uniformities that we encounter across situations. For instance, the relation of hitting 
emerges merely as a regularity that we observe across all the situations that have 
something in common, those that with our language we would describe as involving 
an agent  and a  patient,  with  the  former  acting upon the  latter  in  a  certain  way. 
Observing such regularities, or uniformities,  and getting attuned to them, is what 
agents like us rely on to  classify reality in ways that make it possible to anticipate 
novel situations, as, for instance, to anticipate the fact in situations of hitting in which 
the  patient  is  a  person  (or  an  animal),  the  patient  usually  gets  harmed,  and  to 
appropriately avoid being involved (qua patient) in such situations. Attunement to 
such uniformities, as Perry and Barwise put it, makes it possible to ''cope with the 
new situations that continually arise'',  but also to ''pick up information about one 
situation from another''  (p.  10).  In the latter case,  the uniformities involve two or 
more situations; uniformities that are themselves relational are called constraints. 
We have already seen that constraints can be of various types, e.g.  nomic when 
the constraint is based on a law of nature, as in the example of smoke meaning fre 
(i.e.  smoke  situations  being  constrained  to  be,  or  to  appropriately  involve,  fre 
situations), but also conventional when the constraint is based on a convention, as in 
the example of fre alarm meaning fre, and, more generally, in the case of linguistic 
communication. The idea is that the use of language generates uniformities across 
situations,  and  across  pairs  and,  more  generally,  n-tuples  of  situations,  i.e. 
constraints. Such constraints, in turn, provide language users with effcient means of 
conveying  information  (or,  for  that  matter,  misiformation),  by  exploiting  their 
addressee's  attunement  to  the  constraints  at  stake.  Suppose  that  I  want  to 
communicate to someone that Paul is French, in a situation in which Paul is present 
and I have reasons to believe that my addressee doesn't know that Paul's name is 
Paul. I will then likely exploit the constraint that is conventionally associated with 
the pronoun 'he', viz. that a situation in which an utterance of 'he' occurs constrains 
the described situations to be such that the individual talked about is the same as the 
male individual that the speaker is referring to in the utterance situation, and will 
17 The lack of space prevents me going into more details regarding the relational foundations of the reflexive-
referential theory of meaning; for further discussion, see the Chapter on Reference in the present volume. 
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say,  pointing at  Paul,  ''He is  French''.  Note that  my utterance means that  Paul  is 
French, that is, correlates with situations in which Paul is French, only  conditionally 
upon the conventions associated with the words used. The very same utterance can 
mean, say, that Paul works in continental philosophy, conditionally upon a different 
possible convention, on which 'French' would be used for continental philosophers.
In the same way in which the relational theory of meaning is preserved in Perry's 
recent  theorizing,  so  are  the  underlying  motivations  behind  uniformities  and 
constraints (even if he is no longer using the same vocabulary). In particular, the idea 
that  utterances  have  meaning,  and  convey  information,  only  conditionally  upon 
various conventions and other facts, plays a crucial role in the refexive-referential 
theory. Thus even the level of refexive truth conditions associated with my utterance 
of ''He is French'' hinges upon the assumption that the utterance is one of an English 
sentence in which the words 'he', 'is' and 'French' are used the way they are normally 
used: in the parlance of Perry (2001), given the conventions governing the use of 'he', 
'is',  and 'French',  my utterance  of  ''He is  French''  is  true  if  and only  if  the  male 
individual to whom I am referring with my utterance of 'he' belongs among those to 
whom  I  am  referring  with  my  utterance  of  'French'.  From  such  refexive  truth 
conditions, we get referential content by assuming further facts about the utterance: 
given  those conventions, and given that I am referring to Paul with my utterance of 
'he', and to the French with my utterance of 'French', my utterance is true iff Paul is 
French. The point to be stressed is that meaning, constraints, and information more 
generally, are conditional upon further assumptions and facts and are, in that respect, 
undetachable from their contextual setting.            
(f) The Reference Relation and its Relata. As already noted, situation semantics 
does not assign reference to linguistic expressions directly, the way Fregean theories 
and other traditional frameworks do. To be sure, even in those frameworks, due to 
context-dependence, reference is  not assigned to indexical expressions like 'he'  on 
their own, but rather, to pairs consisting of an expression and a context of use (or 
some other appropriate parameter).  But even if expressions only have a reference 
assigned  relative  to  a  context,  it  is  still  linguistic  expressions  that,  in  those 
frameworks, primarily enter into the reference relation. Situation semantics rejects 
this idea. For one thing, it is not expressions, but particular utterances of expressions, qua 
concrete bits of reality, that can enter into the reference relation. For another, the way 
in which a particular utterance of e.g. the pronoun 'he' can be said to refer to a given 
individual, say Paul, is derivative upon a more basic notion of reference, in which it 
is the speaker using the pronoun who is referring to the individual at stake. The basic 
status of the relations that individuals from a given situation bear with respect other 
individuals (possibly in other situations), in accounting for the notion of reference, is 
yet  another  aspect  on  which  situation  semantics  departs  from  not  only  Fregean 
theories, but from any view that insists on a distinction between speaker reference and 
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semantic reference (cf. Kripke 1977). 
 Situation semantics also departs from the Fregean and other mainstream view 
when it comes to question of what sentences refer to, and what their semantic values 
are.  Since  Frege,  it  is  customary to take the  semantic  value  (reference,  extension, 
denotation) of sentences to be truth values. As pointed out in section 2, Frege held 
that at the level of reference, ''all that is specifc is obliterated'', and was led to the 
view that all true sentences have the same reference, and that so do all the false ones. 
In situation semantics,  once again,  it  is  not  sentences (not even fully interpretted 
sentences,  or,  for  that  matter,  propositions),  that  have  reference.  Rather,  it  is 
utterances  and  other  concrete  situations.  Furthermore,  what  an  utterance  of  a 
sentence refers to is not a truth value, but one or more (other) situations, namely, the 
situation(s) described by the utterance. Note that when the utterance is false, as e.g. 
''It  rained  in  Paris  on  June  1st 2011'',  the  described  situations  are  counterfactual 
situations, rather than any real and concrete situation.18        
(g)  Truth.  It  may  be  said,  in  all  generality,  that  truth  is  a  key  notion  in 
contemporary  semantics  –  or,  at  least,  in  model-theoretic  semantics.  A semantic 
theory assigns semantic values to expressions and, in particular, assigns values of 
truth and falsity to sentences. As noted previously, such values are not assigned to 
sentences on their own, but rather, to sequences consisting of a sentence and a certain 
number  of  other  parameters,  such  as  contexts,  possible  worlds,  or  points  of 
evaluation more  generally.  It  may be  said,  too,  that  while  semantics  deploys  the 
notion of truth, it typically stays neutral on the theory of truth. In other words, values 
of truth and falsity are semantic primitives, on a par with other semantic primitives 
such  as  individuals  or  worlds,  and  in  formal  semantics  the  values  assigned  to 
sentences are often not the 'True' and the 'False', but numbers 1 and 0, which clearly 
indicates the non-committal nature of those frameworks to any theory of truth. 
Now, what about situation semantics? On this score again, it departs radically 
from those other frameworks. For one thing, as we have already seen, the semantic 
values that it attaches to (utterances of) sentences are not truth values, but situations. 
For another, the notion of truth that one fnds in situation semantics comes with a 
certain  conception of  truth,  and one,  moreover,  that  is  not  likely  to  be  met  with 
general agreement. Truth, for Barwise and Perry, is,  again, just another uniformity 
across situations, and so is falsity. A way of explaining the idea would be to say that 
truth makes a partition over situations into two classes: those in which there is an 
utterance such that, given the constrains at play, there is one or more real situations 
described by the utterance, vs. the rest; while falsity, in turn, partitions situations also 
18 In the philosophical literature, there is an argument, known as the Slingshot Argument, that goes back to 
Frege but has been endorsed and elaborated by others (such as the logician Kurt Gödel), aiming to 
demonstrate that sentences can only refer to truth values and cannot be consistently taken to refer to anything 
more specific (as would be propositions, or sets of worlds, or situations). It falls beyond the scope of this 
paper to explain how Barwise and Perry have resisted the argument. For discussion, see Perry (1996).        
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in two classes: those in which there is an utterance such that, given the constrains at 
play, there are one or more abstract, but no real situations described by the utterance, 
vs. the rest. 
It takes little to see that the two partitions need not coincide, since situations in 
which there is no utterance (or at least none that is interpretable) will count among 
''the rest'' on either partition. More importantly, just as we saw that constraints are 
often conditional upon conventions and assumptions of various sorts, truth and falsity 
are also uniformities that will be conditional on other things, and, in particular, on 
the constraints in which the situation at stake is involved. Thus consider again the 
example  of  an utterance of  ''There  is  fre'',  made in a situation in  which there  is 
indeed fre.  This  utterance situation may be classifed under the truth-uniformity, 
conditional upon  the conventions associated with the words 'there', 'is' and  'fre'. Yet 
the very same situation may be classifed under the falsity-uniformity, conditional 
upon another possible  convention, such as one that would associate the word 'fre' 
with, say, situations in which it is sunny, on the assumption that it is not sunny in that 
situation.
To bring the point home, when it comes to truth, we see again a considerable 
departure  not only from Frege's own approach, but also from assumptions and, one 
could even say,  practices, shared by a majority of existing frameworks. Within those 
frameworks, truth is a primitive notion. Furthermore, the question of what are the 
primary bearers of truth is seen as substantive, and it is often taken for granted that it 
is propositions, or contents, that bear a truth value, and to which the truth predicate 
primarily applies. For Barwise and Perry, on the other hand, truth is derivative:  it is 
just a regularity to which agents get  attuned, that  helps them classify reality and 
retrieve information in  ways useful  in anticipating novel  situations  and planning 
action.  The question  of  what  are the primary bearers  of  truth value  becomes  ill-
conceived, and to the extent that it has an answer, it is situations that are susceptible 
of being true or false. There is thus nothing special about truth: simply, situations can 
be classifed as true or false, just as they can be classifed as e.g. evening situations, 
situations  of  hitting,  or  situations  2km  North  of  London.  Of  course,  an  agent's 
capacity to classify a given situation as true rather than false can prove particularly 
useful; but so can an agent's capacity to classify a given situation as dangerous rather 
than harmless. Just as danger falls out as a uniformity across situations, to which 
agents get attuned, and which they can exploit in acting for their own well-being, so 
do truth and falsehood.
(h)  Semantic  Innocence  and  Attitude  Reports. To  close  this  presentation  of 
situation semantics, let me turn to a particular application of the framework, namely 
to attitude reports (broadly speaking), such as ''John believes that Mary used his car'', 
but also reports involving verbs of perception, such as ''John saw that Mary used his 
car'' or even ''John saw Mary use his car''. As we have seen, Frege's own approach 
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was particularly implausible when it came to accounting for attitude reports, for he 
assumed compositionality at  the level  of  reference  and,  given that  sentences  that 
merely coincide on their  truth value cannot  be safely substituted for one another 
within attitude reports, was led to the view that in such contexts, sentences have as 
their reference not a truth value, but what would have been their sense if they were 
not  embedded.  Even  though  this  feature  of  Frege's  view did  not  survive  to  the 
present days, it is still true that broadly Fregean frameworks have diffculties when it 
comes to attitude reports. Now, it is beyond the aim of this chapter to present Perry 
and Barwise's semantics of attitude reports, so let me simply point out some features 
of their framework that make it superior both to Fregean frameworks and to possible 
world semantics (such as the one developed e.g. by Jaakko Hintikka). As pointed out 
previously, the semantic values that situation semantics associates with sentences are 
not truth values, nor are they senses, or propositions, or sets of possible worlds, but 
rather, situations. An attitude report of the form 'A Vs (that) S' (where A is a singular 
term, V a verb of attitude or perception, and S a sentence) requires that the agent A 
stands in relation  V to the situation(s) to which S makes reference. Thus whether a 
sentence occurs on its own or as a 'that'-clause in an attitude report (however deep 
embedded) does not impinge on the sentence's meaning; in either case, its reference 
(in the sense discussed in sect. (f) above) will consist of one or more situations, which 
is what makes it possible for Barwise and Perry to preserve our ''semantic innocence'' 
(as Davidson aptly coined the phrase). Now, it should be noted, too, that situation 
semantics, although ''semantically innocent'', rejects nevertheless compositionality at 
the level of reference. Thus there can be attitude reports of the form 'A Vs that S' and 
'A Vs that  S*' in which  S and S*  happen to refer to the same situations yet the one 
report is true but not the other; the standard Hesperus-Phosphorus cases fall into this 
category.  However,  in  direct  perception  reports,  sentences  referring  to  the  same 
situations may be substituted for one another salva veritate. Thus suppose that Mary 
is Mrs. Jones, but that John is confused and thinks that ''Mrs. Jones'' is someone other 
than Mary. Then ''John believes that Mary used his car'' may be true without ''John 
believes that Mrs. Jones used his car'' being ipso facto true. On the other hand, if ''John 
saw Mary use his car'' is true, then ''John saw Mrs. Jones use his car'' will also be true. 
As a fnal remark, let me point out an aspect in which situation semantics of 
attitude reports  is  also  superior  to  the  frameworks  inspired by  Kripke's  possible 
worlds semantics for modal logics. Such frameworks are known as Hintikka-style 
semantics (cf. Hintikka 1962), or as doxastic-epistemic logics. In those frameworks, 'A 
believes that S' is true iff S is true in all the worlds that A takes to be possible (or, as it 
is customary to speak, iff  S  is true in all of  A's doxastic alternatives for the actual 
world); similarly, 'A knows that S' is true iff S is true in all the worlds that are, from 
A's perspective,  indistinguishable  from  the  actual  world.  Such  possible  world 
frameworks face the so-called problem of logical omniscience. Consider something 
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that is a truth of logic or mathematics. Since such truths hold in all possible worlds, 
ergo in  all  of  the  doxastic  alternatives  of  a  given  agent  as  well,  Hintikka-style 
semantics is committed to the view that it is true to report such an agent to believe the 
truth at  stake,  which goes against  the intuitions.  For,  there  are many logical  and 
mathematical  truths  that  we  fail  to  know  and  thereby  fail  to  believe.  Situation 
semantics has some advantage in this respect, too, for the logical or mathematical 
sentence at stake will, just like any other sentence, have as its reference one or more 
situations, and if the agent at stake is not appropriately related to those situations, the 
belief report may come out false, as expected. For reasons of space, I must abstain 
from discussing the issue of what sort of situations mathematical sentences describe, 
but let us simply consider what seems to be a fairly trivial truth of logic, such as 
''Paula used John's car or she didn't use his car''. Suppose furthermore that John has 
no idea who Paula is, and has no connection to her. Then, in situation semantics, to 
report John to believe that very truth need not come out as a true report. For that 
report to be true, John would need to be related to either a situation in which Paula 
used his car or to one in which she didn't, hence on either option, to a situation that 
involves Paula, which, by hypothesis, isn't the case.
What I have tried to do in this chapter is to offer a survey of situation semantics, 
by developing it around the above eight themes. I hope to have shown to what a 
large extent situation theory was an ambitious programme that departed from the 
mainstream approaches in radical ways. While the pioneering work of Barwise and 
Perry was extremely infuential, it is also fair to say, with the hindsight, that situation 
semantics did not become a widely pursued programme, and that its contemporary 
off-spring (such as Kratzer's semantics) comes much closer to the mainstream views 
than the original Barwise-Perry framework. Now, my aim in this chapter was not so 
much to present situation semantics in all the details of its  sophisticated machinery, 
but rather, dwell more on the underlying philosophical ideas, among which there are 
several that, as I tried to show, continue to occupy a central place in John Perry's 
long-term philosophical enterprise.* 
* I would like to thank Raphael van Riel and Albert Newen for their invitation  to contribute to the present 
volume and for their helpful comments, and Neil van Leeuwen for suggesting me as a contributor. On a 
personal note, I would like to express my immense gratitude to John Perry. Finally, let me acknowledge 
participation and partial funding from the following projects: “Semantic Content and Context-Dependence”, 
MICINN, Spanish Government, grant n° CSD2009-0056; “Context, Content and Compositionality”, 
European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013), grant n° 229 441–CCC, and 
“Perspectival Thoughts and Facts” (PETAF), EC-FP7/2007-2013, grant n° 238 128.
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